In bisherigen Untersuchungen der Auswirkungen aktienkursorientierter Management-Entlohnung auf den Preiswettbewerb wurden Nachfrageschwankungen nicht berücksichtigt. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass Manager auch dann eine größere Kollusionsneigung besitzen als Eigentümer, wenn sich die...

We show that concealing cost information is a dominant strategy in heterogeneous Bertrand oligopolies. This result enables us to endogenize the number of firms in a market in terms of market size, entry costs, and unit cost uncertainty.

Unternehmen müssen nicht immer Kollusionsabsichten verfolgen, wenn sie untereinander Informationen austauschen. Dieser Beitrag zeigt, daß bei Nachfrageunsicherheit auch strikt kompetitive Konkurrenten private Informationen bezüglich ihrer Nachfragebedingungen preisgeben. Dies läßt sich in...

This paper further develops the standard modelling of information exchange between firms in the presence of demand uncertainty which applies to firms in new industries and insecure regions or markets. We replace the normal distribution of the random variables, commonly used because of its...

We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents' actions and maximize...

This paper examines the implications for equilibrium price of a shift in demand and also provides formal characterizations in a general dynamic model of perfect equilibrium, the relation between dominated and dominant strategies, the relation between reversion and generalized reversion strategy...

We build an oligopoly model of the market of scientific journals that allows us to relate the (in-)efficiency of this market to the exogenous distribution of article quality. Journal quality is endogenously determined by the submission choices of scientists. The efficiency of any stable...

Classic artificial intelligence (Q-learning) algorithms have been capable of consistently learning supra-competitive pricing strategies in infinitely repeated Nash-Bertrand pricing games without human communication. Such algorithms have been able to converge due to the temporal correlation of...

We propose a dynamic framework for durable-goods with consumers who have different valuations and an arbitrary number of firms which compete in quantities in each period. Consumers' ability to behave strategically about the timing of consumption differs in the three environments that we analyze....

We study the effect of environmental risk on the extraction of a common resource. Using a dynamic and non-cooperative game in which an environmental event impacts the renewability and the quality of the resource, we show that the anticipation of such an event has an ambiguous effect on...