characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non …-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties. -- Coalitions … ; Core ; Stability ; Status-seeking …

domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on agents' preferences, we …

would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …

In discrete exchange economies with possibly redundant and joint ownership, we propose new core notions in the …-enforcing coalitions and to redistribute their redundant property rights. Our first notion lies between the strong core and the weak core … and is independent of Balbuzanov and Kotowski's (2019a) exclusion core. Our second notion refines the first and the …

sovereignty, meaning that a deviating coalition of players does not have the power to arrange the matches of agents outside the … coalition. We study both the case of pairwise and coalitional deviations. We argue further that dominance has to be replaced by … matchings that belong to the core. We also show that the pairwise and coalitional analogues of the level-1 farsighted set yield …

(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for … show the equivalence between the set of pairwise stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition …

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d?Aspremont and …

. The core predicts a unique and extreme outcome: the entire surplus is split evenly among the buyers when m > n and among … the sellers when m < n; the long side gets nothing. We test this core conjecture in the lab with n + m = 3 or 5 randomly … agreements while trading. Despite frequent attempts to collude and occasional large deviations from the core prediction, we find …

backward induction procedure to pinpoint the latest moment at which a coalition can be found with both an incentive and the … this way will be agreed upon at the outset - or, if a suitable coalition is never found, that no agreement will be reached. …