Showing 1 - 7 of 7
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010248305
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002815973
This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013225056
This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467366
We estimate an equilibrium model of decision-making in the US Supreme Court which takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We present a measure of the value of information in the court. Our measure is the probability that a justice votes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014203356
We consider strategic voting with incomplete information and partially common values in sequential committees. A proposal is considered against the status quo in one committee, and only upon its approval advances for consideration in a second committee. Committee members (i) are privately and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224745
We study how campaign contributions affect the voting strategies and effectiveness of justices in the Supreme Court of eight US states. A judge's voting strategy leans more heavily towards an interest group the larger are its contributions to the judge, and the smaller are its contributions to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111285