The paper analyzes the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax in a model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally mobile firm. We show that regional tax coordination can lead to two types of welfare gains. First, for investments that would take...

The paper analyzes the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax in a model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally mobile firm. We show that regional tax coordination can lead to two types of welfare gains. First, for investments that would take...

This paper studies the impact of special interest lobbying on competition between two countries for a multinational in a common agency framework. We examine the following questions. On the positive side, is special interest lobbying a determinant of competition for FDI? If so, how does this work...

Motivated by the EU Commission s suggested company tax reforms, this paper investigates how cross-border loss offset and formulary apportionment of a consolidated tax base affect the investment and transfer pricing behaviour of a multijurisdictional firm, and how they affect the behaviour of...

This paper shows how the distribution of the ownership of multinational companies and the labour market conditions, especially the wage formation process, influence the outcome of interjurisdictional tax competition and coordination. In particular, it sets forth that equilibrium corporate tax...

This paper analyses the effects of a regionally coordinated corporate income tax in a model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally mobile firm. We show that regional tax coordination can lead to two types of welfare gain. First, for investments that...

The existing theoretical literature on fiscal competition has to a large extent ignored the role of government debt as a determinant of taxes and productive public spending. We develop a simple model of fiscal competition with government borrowing. If a default on government debt is no option,...

We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a "second-mover advantage." In our model, firms do not unanimously prefer lower environmental-standard levels. We introduce this feature to an...

In our paper, we demonstrate that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure, coordination through a uniform tax rate or a minimum rate does not necessarily create the welfare effects observed under pure tax competition. The divergence is even worse when the competing jurisdictions...

This paper shows how competition among governments for mobile firms can bring about excessive differentiation in levels of taxation and public good provision. Hotelling s Principle of Minimum Differentiation is applied in the context of tax competition and shown to be invalid. Instead, when an...