Vertical separation of generation from electricity retailing has often been required as a condition of electricity market liberalisation. A well-developed and liquid contracts market is similarly suggested as necessary to manage the resulting wholesale market risks, which risks are further...

We study how vertical integration in a two-sided media market affects investments in premium content. We show that a content provider provides the premium content exclusively to a platform, regardless of what the vertical structure of the industry is. However, a vertically integrated content...

This paper first introduces an approach relying on market games to examine how successive oligopolies do operate between downstream and upstream markets. This approach is then compared with the traditional analysis of oligopolistic interaction in successive markets. The market outcomes resulting...

We study an industry in which an upstream monopolist supplies an essential input at a regulated price to several downstream firms. Legal unbundling means that a downstream firm owns the upstream firm but this upstream firm is legally independent and maximizes its own upstream profits. We allow...

We examine the role of private information on the impact of vertical mergers. A vertical merger can improve the information that is available to an upstream monopolist because, after the merger, the monopolist can observe the cost of its downstream merger partner. In the pre-merger world,...

This paper analyzes the impact of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff and on its incentive to vertically integrate when firms in both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that as competition becomes more intense, the upstream firm obtains a larger share of a...

The paper explores incentives for strategic vertical separation of firms in a framework of a simple duopoly model. Each firm chooses either to be a retailer of its own good (vertical integration) or to sell its good through an independent exclusive retailer (vertical separation). In the latter...

The paper explores incentives for strategic vertical separation of firms in a framework of a simple duopoly model. Each firm chooses either to be a retailer of its own good (vertical integration) or to sell its good through an independent exclusive retailer (vertical separation). In the latter...

This paper analyzes vertical integration incentives in a bilaterally duopolistic industry where upstream producers bargain with downstream retailers on terms of supply. In the applied framework integration does not affect the total output produced, but it affects the distribution of rents among...

We study upstream horizontal mergers and their potential efficiency gains. We show that an upstream horizontal merger can give rise to two efficiency-enhancing effects when firms trade through two-part tariffs. It increases R&D investments and decreases wholesale prices when downstream...