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Theory in economic anthropology
Ensminger, Jean Evelyn (contributor); Ensminger, Jean (ed.) - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001596856
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Theory in economic anthropology at the turn of the century
Ensminger, Jean Evelyn - In: Theory in economic anthropology, (pp. 9-19). 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001689300
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Experimental economics : a powerful new method for theory testing in anthropology
Ensminger, Jean Evelyn - In: Theory in economic anthropology, (pp. 59-78). 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001689307
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Culture and property rights
Ensminger, Jean Evelyn - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000970307
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Changing property rights : reconciling formal and informal rights to land in Africa
Ensminger, Jean Evelyn - In: The frontiers of the new institutional economics : …, (pp. 165-196). 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001402326
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Building a dictator : a social choice analysis of the line item veto
Sieberg, Katri K. - In: Homo oeconomicus 28 (2011) 1/2, pp. 123-141
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009241372
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An experimental study of jury voting behavior
Anderson, Lisa R.; Holt, Charles A.; Sieberg, Katri K.; … - In: The political economy of governance : institutions, …, (pp. 157-178). 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011326552
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Deciding how to choose the healthcare system
Švecova, Olga V.; Sieberg, Katri K. - In: Advances in political economy : institutions, modelling …, (pp. 145-166). 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009729421
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Information and cooperation
Sieberg, Katri K. - In: Homo oeconomicus 29 (2013) 4, pp. 467-495
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009758022
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An experimental study of strategic voting and accuracy of verdicts with sequential and simultaneous voting
Anderson, Lisa R.; Holt, Charles A.; Sieberg, Katri K.; … - In: Games 13 (2022) 2, pp. 1-29
In a model of simultaneous voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) consider the possibility that jurors vote strategically, rather than sincerely reflecting their individual information. This results in the counterintuitive result that a jury is more likely to convict the innocent under a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172468