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The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms in Interorganizational Ego Networks – A Game Theoretical Analysis –

Kudic, Muhamed; Banaszak, Marc - 2009

efficiency analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demonstrates that not one single … sensibilisiert für Problematiken, die mit diskretionären Elementen in Governance-Strukturen verbunden sind, und zeigt, dass nicht ein …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271408

The economic optimality of sanction mechanisms in interorganizational ego networks : a game theoretical analysis

Kudic, Muhamed; Banaszak, Marc - 2009

perspective, a still widely underemphasized topic in the literature. -- alliance portfolio ; ego network ; governance ; sanctions … efficiency analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demonstrates that not one single … erfüllen. Die Effizienzanalyse sensibilisiert für Problematiken, die mit diskretionären Elementen in Governance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003878527

Strategic outsourcing revisited

Bühler, Stefan (contributor); Haucap, Justus (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

This paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing the production of a non-specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input market. We apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) to characterize the different equilibria. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001783571

Radical innovation and network evolution

Phlippen, Sandra; Riccaboni, Massimo - 2007

This paper examines how a radical technological innovation affects alliance formation of firms and subsequent network structures. We use longitudinal data of interfirm R&D collaborations in the biopharmaceutical industry in which a new technological regime is established. Our findings suggest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372508

Failure Risk and Quality Cost Management in Single versus Multiple Sourcing Decision

Yim, Andrew - 2014

The advantage of multiple sourcing to protect against supplier failures arising from undependable products due to latent defects is examined using a model with non-linear external failure costs. Prior research has focused only on supplier failures arising from unreliable supply, such as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045047

Formal contracts, relational contracts, and the threat-point effect

Itoh, Hideshi; Morita, Hodaka - 2011

Can formal contracts help resolving the holdup problem? We address this important question by studying the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer in which the seller can make relation-specific investments in each period. In contrast to previous findings, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277359

When Sharing Platforms Fix Sellers' Prices

Nowag, Julian - 2018

While price-fixing on platforms can attract severe enforcement action, as shown by the Amazon poster case, a more nuanced picture emerges regarding the fixing of prices for sellers by sharing economy platforms. This paper explores possible antitrust responses to such centralised platform-driven...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012914371

Formal contracts, relational contracts, and the threat-point effect

Itō, Hideshi; Morita, Hodaka - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009240848

Backward Versus Forward Integration of Firms in Global Value Chains

Egger, Peter; Erhardt, Katharina; Masllorens, Gerard - 2021

Production processes are increasingly organized in international value-chain networks. The involved firms can be operating at arm’s length or be vertically integrated. Both the incidence and the direction of integration (backward or forward in the value chain) depend on specific...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013224089

Adaptive Build-Up and Breakdown of Trust : An Agent-Based Computational Approach

Gorobets, Alexander; Nooteboom, Bart - 2006

This article employs Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) to investigate whether, and under what conditions, trust is viable in markets.The emergence and breakdown of trust is modeled in a context of multiple buyers and suppliers.Agents develop trust in a partner as a function of observed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065508