The literature on the rational PBC suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chances of eelection. Most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre-election distortions in fiscal policy. We propose a new test that...

This study examines the effect of regulatory independence of the central bank in shaping the impact of electoral cycles on bank lending behaviour in Africa. It employs the dynamic system Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM) Two-Step estimator for a panel dataset of 54 African countries over the...

This paper exploits a natural experiment in Hesse where a reform of the electoral rule from mayor appointment by the local council towards direct mayor elections was introduced during a phase-in period from 1993 to 1998. The end of the term of the last appointed mayor varies across...

A long-standing issue in political economics is whether party control makes a difference in determining fiscal and economics policies. This question is very difficult to answer empirically since parties are not randomly selected to govern political entities. This paper uses a...

Although pre-electoral political manipulation of the budget --- the political budget cycle (PBC) --- has been long investigated by scholars, empirical findings are mixed at best. This is partly because of the non-random nature of election timing. There also exist ongoing debates over how the...

This study investigates how firms’ lobbying activities change over business cycles. We show that firms lobby more during recessions. Aside from active lobbying firms, non-lobbying firms are also more likely to start lobbying during recessions. Corporate lobbying generally responds only to...

The political budget cycle (PBC) literature argues that governments expand deficits in election years. However, what happens when an economic downturn is expected? Will the government allow the deficit to expand even further, or will it resort to spending cuts and tax increases? When voters...

The literature on political business cycles follows two analytical conventions: (1) polity is reasonably reduced to a single agent who is either opportunistic or partisan and (2) economy is an equilibrated entity that is subject to politically inspired shocks. This paper pursues a different...

The Variable Rational Partisan Business Cycle model is developed, where agents face uncertainty regarding the timing and outcome of the next election. The model predicts that partisan influences on the economy persist throughout the government's rule and are further influenced, in the opposite...