Respondents of contingent valuation surveys may place a null value on the public good, for reasons that differ from a genuine indifference to the good, but that can be interpreted as a "protest": either against the interview, or the public management, or both. A good survey design can...

When modelling data generated from a discrete choice contingent valuation question, the treatment of zero bids affects the welfare estimates. Zero bids may come from respondents who are not interested in the provision of the public good; alternatively, some zero-bidders may be protesting about...

Selectivity bias caused by protest responses in Contingent Valuation studies can be detected and corrected by means of sample selection models. This paper compares two methods: the Heckman 2-steps method and the full ML, applied to data on forest recreation - where WTP is elicited as a...

Respondents of contingent valuation surveys may place a null value on the public good, for reasons that differ from a genuine indifference to the good, but that can be interpreted as a "protest": either against the interview, or the public management, or both. A good survey design can...

Selectivity bias caused by protest responses in Contingent Valuation studies can be detected and corrected by means of sample selection models. This paper compares two methods: the Heckman 2-steps method and the full ML, applied to data on forest recreation - where WTP is elicited as a...

We replicate three pricing tasks of Gneezy, List and Wu (2006) for which they document the so-called uncertainty effect, namely, that people value a binary lottery over non-monetary outcomes less than other people value the lottery's worse outcome. While the authors implemented a verbal lottery...

Information frictions play an important role in many theories of expectation formation. We use a survey experiment to generate direct evidence on how people select, acquire and process information. Participants can buy different information signals that could help them forecast future national...

Surveys can increase market transparency when information asymmetries are present — but this will only happen when respondents answer questions truthfully. Sometimes, however, it might not be in the respondents' best interest to provide truthful information on their firm or market. This will...

Knowledge of consumer demand is important for firms, policy-makers, and economists. One common tool for incentive-compatible demand elicitation, the Becker-DeGroot- Marschak (BDM) mechanism, has been widely used in laboratory settings but rarely evaluated for reliability at large scale in the...

In this paper we investigate whether there are differences in design effects between trained and fresh respondents. In three experiments, we varied the number of items on a screen, the choice of response categories, and the layout of a five point rating scale. We find that trained respondents...