We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers are heterogeneous in knowledge: some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered, some know only the prices and some know neither. We show that two types of signalling...

Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product...

This paper analyzes consumers' privacy choice concerning their private data and firms' ensuing pricing strategy. The General Data Protection Regulation passed by the European Union in May 2018 allows consumers to decide whether to reveal private information in the form of cookies to an online...

A Cournot oligopoly in which firms face incomplete information with respect to production capacities is studied. For the case where the firms’ capacities are stochastically independent, the functional form of equilibrium strategies is derived. If inverse demand is concave, a unique symmetric...

We consider a repeated regulation model in an oligopoly under asymmetric information with pollution. An iterative procedure is proposed where the regulator designs stationary taxes, and firms are not required to be perfectly rational. They can form and update simple beliefs about their...

In a laboratory experiment with supply function competition and private information about correlated costs we study whether cost interdependence leads to greater market power in relation to when costs are uncorrelated in the ways predicted by Bayesian supply function equilibrium. We find that...

Yes, but one needs to assume that consumers know the realized price distribution, and that they do not know which firm has what price. Even with identical consumers and identical firms, if firms set prices in a first stage, and if consumers search sequentially in a second stage, then price...

It is well known that the presence of imperfect monitoring limits the possibility of making efficient agreements. When firms interact repeatedly in multiple markets, however, we show that noisy observations may improve the possibility of collusion. When observation is noisy in at least one...

This paper examines the strategic use of forward trading by an incumbent producer who faces potential entry under incomplete information. We show the existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in which the incumbent uses forward transactions to deter entry that would have occurred under complete...

This paper studies choice of organizational structure (vertical separation or vertical integration) under demand uncertainty with incomplete information. In order to highlight our assertions, a price duopolistic competition model with stochastic demand is considered. The stochastic demand, once...