This paper endogenizes the matching structure of teams in a simple environment with moral hazard. We show that team incentive problems may, on their own, generate monotone matching predictions in the absence of complementarities or anti-complementarities in production technology. We also derive...

This paper presents findings from a census of more than 79,000 stock-keeping units (SKUs) in 37 consumer packaged goods categories totaling $55 billion in annual revenue. It shows that, in 86% of product categories, the relationship between market share and retail distribution is increasing and...

We consider the role of local geographic peers in determining equilibrium firm behavior. We exploit in-transitivity in local peer-firm networks and utilize spatial econometric techniques to circumvent well-known challenges in estimating and interpreting empirical models of peer effects. We find...

This paper considers a firm's optimal investment in training and motivation measures in a hidden action agency problem. We study how these measures interact with each other and the contract in order to create value for the firm. Productivity enhancing training can be firm specific or non-firm...

This paper considers a hidden action agency model in which an agent can be incentivized to simultaneously work and self train to increase productivity. We determine conditions under which the principal wants to incentivize concurrent working and training and conditions under which the agent...

This paper considers the twofold problem of compensation contracting and the design of a human capital investment scheme. Before contracting the principal and the agent can engage in a joint stochastic production process of exerting effort to raise the agent's productivity in the firm. The...

Pure incentive schemes rely on agent self-interest, rather than more coercive control, to motivate subordinates. Yet most organizations, and in particular public agencies, rely very little on pure incentive contracts. Most organizations rely on the primarily coercive mechanisms of monitoring and...

In this paper, we employ a sequential production setting in order to study the tradeoff between timeliness and accuracy of a signal about productivity. An information externality arises because the upstream agent's information is disseminated to the downstream agent, and affects production...

In this paper we investigate the ways in which new forms of organization enabled by digital technologies such as crowdsourcing and digital marketplaces are allowing firms to circumvent and defy traditional knowledge constraints. This is part of the broader question of when and why these forms of...