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Managerial Remuneration and Disciplining in the UK : A Tale of Two Governance Regimes

Renneboog, Luc - 2010

We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market (CEO turnover and remuneration schemes) in two … to CEO remuneration, we sketch a nuanced picture as we find some evidence supporting the alignment of interests … hypothesis, but also supporting the managerial power or skimming model for managerial remuneration practices in the UK prior to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135217

Corporate Lobbying and CEO Pay

Skaife, Hollis Ashbaugh - 2013

This study examines the agency costs of corporate lobbying by exploring the relation between lobbying and excess CEO compensation. We show that CEOs of firms engaged in lobbying earn significantly greater compensation levels compared to CEOs in non-lobbying firms, after controlling for standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074468

Multidimensional Corporate Governance : Board Design, Executive Compensation, and Information Sharing

Chen, Kevin D. - 2020

Corporate governance is a multidimensional construct, with many interactive mechanisms that must be simultaneously managed for efficiency. We develop a model where multiple governance mechanisms (board independence, board expertise, and CEO equity incentives) are endogenously selected to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012835900

Director Self-Dealing and the Design of Compensation Contracts

Fang, Lily H.; Huang, Sterling - 2022

In 2020, the average total director compensation in U.S. listed companies stood at $450,680, 6.67 times the median household income. Company pairs with shared directors have more similar pay than can be explained by size, industry, and performance. Following a landmark Delaware court ruling that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013405016

Director Self-Dealing and the Design of Compensation Contracts

Fang, Lily H.; Huang, Sterling - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013405637

Skilled Labor Risk and Compensation Policies

Qiu, Yue - 2019

We measure U.S. publicly traded companies' exposures to skilled labor risk, i.e., the potential failure in attracting and retaining skilled labor, by the intensity of their discussions on this issue in their 10-K filings. We show that this measure effectively captures firm risk due to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902137

Information Externalities in Corporate Governance

Raff, Konrad - 2011

This paper studies the interactions between monitoring choices in different firms. Shareholders gather information about a common industry shock and subsequently intervene with management. An information externality arises because intervention transmits information about industry conditions to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128412

Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited : Theory and Evidence from a Recessionary Financial Market

Kesten, Jay - 2012

Does managerial entrenchment create or destroy shareholder value? This Article presents both theory and evidence that the answer to this question is not monolithic, but rather depends on factors that vary greatly with the macroeconomic climate, such as firm profitability, takeover frequency, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116368

Competition, Managerial Slack, and Corporate Governance

Golan, Limor - 2014

We model the interaction between product market competition and internal governance at firms. Competition makes it more difficult to infer a manager's action given the realized output, thus increasing the cost of inducing effort. An exogenous change in the incentive to shirk increases managerial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068416

Ownership Structure, Control Contestability, and Corporate Debt Maturity

Ben‐Nasr, Hamdi - 2015

The corporate governance literature has shown that self-interested controlling owners tend to divert corporate resources for private benefits at the expense of other shareholders. Such behavior leads the controlling owners to prefer long maturity debt to short maturity debt, to avoid frequent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013014423

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