We consider a platform that carries content from two upstream content providers and presents personalized recommendations to participating customers. We focus on streaming platforms in media markets, where users pay a subscription fee to join the platform but no usage fee, and consume a mix of...

I extend Shy and Wang's (2011) model and study the problem of successive monopoly when complementarity is imperfect. In my model, consumers value the good no matter they pay in cash or by card. However, they are willing to pay a higher price if they can enjoy additional card service. Since...

This study describes and formulates the “new layer player co-opetition strategy” in a two-sided market. A new layer player co-opetition strategy intermediates between one side of the market and the incumbent platform(s). Nearly all previous studies on competition in two-sided market...

This study provides the first empirical test of strategic interactions in the pricing decisions of regulated utilities. Since publicly owned water utilities in Sweden are governed by a cost-of-service regulation, prices in neighboring municipalities should not affect the own price other than...

In this study, we analyze the incentives of a streaming platform to bias consumption when products are vertically differentiated. The platform offers mixed bundles of content to monetize consumer interest in variety and pays royalties to sellers based on the effective consumption of the...

This paper explains why platforms such as Amazon and Visa rely predominantly on ad-valorem fees, fees which increase proportionally with transaction prices. It also provides a new explanation for why ad-valorem sales taxes are more desirable than specific taxes. The theory rests on the ability...

This article summarizes and draws connections among diverse streams of theoretical and empirical research on the economics of privacy. We focus on the economic value and consequences of protecting and disclosing personal information, and on consumers' understanding and decisions regarding the...

We explore through both an economics and regulatory lens the frictions associated with credit rating agencies in the aftermath of the financial crisis. While ratings and other public signals are an efficient response to scale economies in information production, these also can discourage...

This paper builds a dynamic general equilibrium model of the market for attention. In the model, digital platforms compete for consumer attention by investing in the quality of their services which they provide for free. They sell the attention, in the form of advertisements, to firms in the...

We study the incentives of a streaming platform to bias consumption when products are vertically differentiated. The platform offers mixed bundles of content to monetize consumers' interest in variety and pays royalties to sellers based on the effective consumption of the content they produce....