Licensing in a patent thicket allows firms to either avoid or resolve hold-up. Firms' R&D incentives depend on whether they license ex ante or ex post. We develop a model of a patent portfolio race, which allows for endogenous R&D efforts, to study firms' choice between ex ante and ex post...

In a dynamic environment where underlying competition is "for the market," this paper examines what happens when entrants and incumbents can instead negotiate for the market. For instance, this might arise when an entrant innovator can choose to license to or be acquired by an incumbent firm;...

We examine whether the introduction of a patent commons, a special type of royalty free patent pool available to the open source software (OSS) community influences new OSS product entry by start-up software firms. In particular, we analyze the impact of The Commons--established by the Open...

This paper analyzes optimal cross-licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants. The optimal cross-licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis-a-vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation. We show...

In a dynamic environment where underlying competition is "for the market," this paper examines what happens when entrants and incumbents can instead negotiate for the market. For instance, this might arise when an entrant innovator can choose to license to or be acquired by an incumbent firm;...

We examine whether the introduction of a patent commons, a special type of royalty free patent pool available to the open source software (OSS) community influences new OSS product entry by start-up software firms. In particular, we analyze the impact of The Commons--established by the Open...