endorsed by good signals and fundamentally changed by bad signals. Experts condition their cheating on a consumer's risk of … suffering from a serious problem if they can observe consumer information. Accordingly, experts and low-risk consumers benefit …Markets for expert services are characterized by information asymmetries between experts and consumers. We analyze the …

costs to hide or to uncover taxable transactions, by imposing risk on risk-averse tax evaders and by distorting competition …

. In theory, poorly informed consumers can protect themselves from maltreatment through sellers by asking for second … field experiment in the market for computer repairs. We find that revealing a second opinion from another expert to the …

to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert’s … provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert’s promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the promise is … broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most …