In this paper we present a differential game model of two firms with different technologies producing the same good and selling in the same world market. The firm equipped with advanced technology is deciding whether to outsource parts of its production to the home country of its competitor,...

We analyze a repeated game in which countries are polluting and investing in technologies. While folk theorems point out that the first best can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium when the players are sufficiently patient, we derive the second-best equilibrium when they are not. This...

We analyze a repeated game in which countries are polluting as well as investing in technologies. While folk theorems point out that the first best can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium when the players are sufficiently patient, we derive the second best equilibrium when they are...

We analyze a repeated game in which countries are polluting as well as investing in technologies. While folk theorems point out that the first best can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium when the players are sufficiently patient, we derive the second best equilibrium when they are...