Showing 1 - 10 of 38
We consider two players facing identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs are public information, the ensuing free-rider...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333870
This paper introduces a contest model in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize. Applications of the model include procurement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334144
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012127011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011299667
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011873944
This paper introduces a contest model in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize. Applications of the model include procurement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571033
We consider two players facing identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs are public information, the ensuing free-rider...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658114
We use the tools of mechanism design, combined with the theory of risk measures, to analyze a model where a cash constrained owner of an asset with stochastic returns raises capital from a population of investors that di¤er in their risk aversion and budget constraints. The distribution of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014349658
Bitcoin's main innovation lies in allowing a decentralized system that relies on anonymous, profit driven miners who can freely join the system. We formalize these properties in three axioms: anonymity of miners, no incentives for miners to consolidate, and no incentive to assuming multiple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012859360
A key part of decentralized consensus protocols is a procedure for random selection, which is the source of the majority of miners cost and wasteful energy consumption in Bitcoin. We provide a simple economic model for random selection mechanism and show that any PoW protocol with natural...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012861529