We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a … potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency …. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he …

We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a … potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency …. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he …

Strikes, just as other types of conflict, used to be difficult to explain from an economic perspective. Initially, it … asymmetric information to prominence as a significant cause of strikes. After reviewing such long-standing potential explanations … with the union can lead to strikes. Additionally, power asymmetries, reputation-building, and internal union politics can …

Strikes, just as other types of conflict, used to be difficult to explain from an economic perspective. Initially, it … asymmetric information to prominence as a significant cause of strikes. After reviewing such long-standing potential explanations … with the union can lead to strikes. Additionally, power asymmetries, reputation-building, and internal union politics can …

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

bargaining models between unions and firms. While the Nash bargaining solution is unaffected by minimum wages below initially … bargained wages, we show that such minimum wages can drive up wages - and be harmful to employment - when bargaining follows the …

The labor economics literature has shown that the "efficient bargaining" model, in which wage and employment are … wage is determined via bargaining and employment determined subsequently and unilaterally by the firm. This paper reports … an experiment in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous within a noncooperative game. We find that …

The purpose of this paper is to analyze bargaining between a firm and a finite set of workers. In particular employment … selected workers then decide whether they want to proceed in bargaining with the firm. Finally, bargaining takes place. In …

This paper studies a two-sided incomplete information bargaining model between a seller and a buyer. The buyer has an … outside option, which is modeled as a sequential search process during which he can also choose to return to bargaining at any …, in contrast to bargaining with complete information, the option to return to bargaining is not redundant in equilibrium …