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Ambiguous beliefs on damages and civil liability theories
Mondello, Gérard - 2013
This paper analyzes the meaning of comparing the economic performance of strict liability and negligence rule in a unilateral standard accident model under Knightian uncertainty. It focuses on the cost expectation of major harm on which the injurers form beliefs. It shows first that, when the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189329
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Hazardous activities and civil strict liability : the regulator's dilemma
Mondello, Gérard - 2011
; Strict Liability ; Ex-Ante Regulation ; Ex-Post Liability ; Judgment-Proof ; Environment Law ; CERCLA ; Environmental … efficiency of two main civil liability regimes usually enforced to protect the environment: the strict liability regime and the … corresponding to frequent random controls with low fines rather than few controls that should involve heavy fines. -- Environment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008903426
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Risky activities and strict liability rules : delegating safe
Mondello, Gérard - 2010
-Post Liability ; Judgment-Proof ; Environment Law ; CERCLA ; Environmental Liability …This paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the environment in an economy … minimized by the efficient contract supplied by the principal. -- Environment ; Strict Liability ; Ex-Ante Regulation ; Ex …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008735714
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The equivalence of strict liability and negligence rule : a "trompe l'œil" perspective
Mondello, Gérard - 2012
This paper analyzes the difficulties of comparing the respective effectiveness of two among the most important liability regimes in tort law: rule of negligence and strict liability. Starting from the standard Shavellian unilateral accident scheme, I show that matching up liability regime on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506385
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Hazardous Activities and Civil Strict Liability : The Regulator's Dilemma
Mondello, Gerard - 2013
efficiency of two main civil liability regimes usually enforced to protect the environment: the strict liability regime and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093754
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Ambiguous Beliefs on Damages and Civil Liability Theories
Mondello, Gérard - 2013
This paper analyzes the meaning of comparing the economic performance of strict liability and negligence rule in a unilateral standard accident model under Knightian uncertainty. It focuses on the cost expectation of major harm on which the injurers form beliefs. It shows first that, when the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075476
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The Equivalence of Strict Liability and Negligence Rule : A Trompe L'oeil Perspective
Mondello, Gerard - 2012
This paper analyzes the difficulties of comparing the respective effectiveness of two among the most important liability regimes in tort law: rule of negligence and strict liability. Starting from the standard Shavellian unilateral accident scheme, I show that matching up liability regime on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171436
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Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules : Delegating Safety
Mondello, Gerard - 2010
This paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the environment in an economy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190647
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Relative performance of liability rules : experimental evidence
Angelova, Vera; Attanasi, Giuseppe; Hiriart, Yolande - 2016
We compare the performance of liability rules for managing environmental disasters when third parties are harmed and cannot always be compensated. A firm can invest in safety to reduce the likelihood of accidents. The firm's investment is unobservable to authorities. Externality and asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530056
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Relative performance of liability rules : experimental evidence
Angelova, Vera; Attanasi, Giuseppe; Hiriart, Yolande - 2012
We compare the performance of liability rules for managing environmental disasters when third parties are harmed and cannot always be compensated. A firm can invest in safety to reduce the likelihood of accidents. The firm's investment is unobservable to authorities. Externality and asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009515729