We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A forward …

We analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of labor market signaling where innate productive ability is not only … unobserved by the government, but also by prospective employers. Signaling in both one and two dimensions is considered, where in …

In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers …' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information … workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms …

This paper studies how subsidies for solar systems can lead to second-degree moral hazard - the impulse of installers … to increase prices and/or reduce labor input when customers receive subsidies. Employing an instrumental variable … subsidy levels are associated with a cost increase when customers receive unconditional upfront subsidies as compared to …