This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate...

The corporate governance debate has focused recently on executive compensation. While defenders of the status quo assert that CEO compensation - and corporate governance generally - is efficient, critics contend that boards have been captured by powerful CEOs who demand excessive pay...

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...

This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on executive incentive schemes. We argue that excessive risk-taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate...

The subprime crisis led to a wave of government interventions in the private sector that has been particularly strong in Europe and Latin America, where several governments are large shareholders in a variety of public firms. In a sense, the subprime crisis induced these governments to behave as...

This paper explores the relationship between employee rights and dividend policy across countries. Using labor right index as a proxy for agency costs of employees, we test the association between labor rights and dividend policies across countries. The empirical results reveal that labor rights...

This paper explores the relationship between employee rights and dividend policy across countries. Using labor right index as a proxy for agency costs of employees, we test the association between labor rights and dividend policies across countries. The empirical results reveal that labor rights...

We investigate the effect of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk-taking for a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997-2004 (i.e. 1,534 observations). Bank managers have incentives to prefer less risk while bank shareholders have preference for ‘excessive' risk....

Over the period 1980-2007 multinational firms' investment grew four times faster than worldwide GDP. Yet the evidence on whether global diversification is valuable is inconclusive. This paper uses detailed FDI data for 251 UK multinational firms and 4,676 subsidiaries to show that multinational...