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The political economy of financial fragility
Feijen, Erik; Perotti, Enrico C. - 2005
followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even … by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348359
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The political economy of financial systems
Haber, Stephen H.; Perotti, Enrico C. - 2008
This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374399
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Investor protection and entry
Perotti, Enrico C.; Volpin, Paolo - 2006
Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350369
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Investor Protection, Regulation and Bank Risk-Taking Behavior
Teixeira, João C. A. - 2020
This paper examines whether the influence of investor protection on banks' risk is channeled through banking regulation, and vice-versa, using panel data from a sample of 567 European and US banks for the 2004–2015 period. As banking regulatory factors, we consider capital stringency, activity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839033
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Countercyclical capital regulation and bank ownership structure
Trani, Tommaso - 2012
This paper develops a macroeconomic framework where the representative bank is owned by inside and outside owners and copes with capital requirements that vary countercyclically. The issuance of outside equity is characterized getting insights from the literature on corporate governance,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009625646
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On banking regulation and lobbying
Gersbach, Hans; Papageorgiou, Stylianos - 2019 - This version: January 2019
equilibrium setting, capital requirements and lobbying contributions are determined as the outcome of bargaining between banks and … politicians. We show that bankers and politicians agree on lobbying contributions and capital regulation that renders banks … capital regulation standards from international agreements eliminate lobbying incentives, yielding an efficient and fair …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962140
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Bank Loan Loss Provisions, Investor Protection and the Macroeconomy
Ozili, Peterson K - 2019
This study investigates the non-discretionary determinants of bank loan loss provisions in Africa after controlling for macroeconomic fluctuation, financial development and investor protection. We find that non-performing loans, loan-to-asset ratio and loan growth are significant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901556
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Self-Fulfilling Liquidity Dry-Ups
Malherbe, Frederic - 2012
This paper presents a model in which cash holding imposes a negative externality because it worsens future adverse selection in markets for long-term assets, which impairs their role for liquidity provision. Adverse selection worsens when potential sellers of long-term assets hold more cash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099217
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Bank deregulation, competition and economic growth : the US free banking experience
Ager, Philipp; Spargoli, Fabrizio - 2013
We exploit the introduction of free banking laws in US states during the 1837-1863 period to examine the impact of removing barriers to bank entry on bank competition and economic growth. As governments were not concerned about systemic stability in this period, we are able to isolate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227307
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Financial development and minimum capital requirements in macroeconomic analysis
Sunaga, Miho - 2023
We develop a macroeconomic model with a moral hazard problem between financial intermediaries and households, which causes inefficient resource allocation, to make us reconsider the financial regulation according to financial development, and individual and aggregate economic activities in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014232599