We study a matching market with N agents who compete over M = αN opportunities. Agents must perform a costly inspection to verify compatibility prior to matching, and are willing to inspect their current favorite opportunity only if, should they find it compatible, they will be guaranteed a...

We study how to initially allocate emission permits in an emissions trading system where firms also compete in a production market a la Cournot. We provide efficiency guarantee of simple uniform linear allocation mechanisms in the broad class of component-wise concave mechanisms in which the...

We study a general finite horizon, periodic review combined inventory and pricing model with N suppliers and T periods, where both the demands and the supply mechanisms are random. The random supply mechanisms are of a general type that includes most structures encountered in practice. Demands...

In this paper we standardize, compare, and aggregate results from thirteen surveys of technology experts, performed over a period of five years using a range of different methodologies, but all aiming at eliciting expert judgment on the future cost of five key energy technologies and how future...

In the present paper we use the output of multiple expert elicitation surveys on the future cost of key low-carbon technologies and use it as input of three Integrated Assessment models, GCAM, MARKAL_US and WITCH. By means of a large set of simulations we aim to assess the implications of these...

In this paper we standardize, compare, and aggregate results from thirteen surveys of technology experts, performed over a period of five years using a range of different methodologies, but all aiming at eliciting expert judgment on the future cost of five key energy technologies and how future...