We develop an analytical model to derive the competitive market equilibrium for electricity spot and reserve markets under stochastic demand and uncertain renewable electricity generation. We then derive the welfare-optimal provision of reserves. At first-best, cost of reserve capacity is...

Anecdotal evidence indicates that electricity producers use production failures to disguise strategic reductions of capacity in order to influence prices, but systematic evidence is lacking. We use a quasi-experimental set up and data from the Swedish energy market to examine such behavior. In a...

Anecdotal evidence indicates that electricity producers use production failures to disguise strategic reductions of capacity in order to influence prices, but systematic evidence is lacking. We use a quasi-experimental set up and data from the Swedish energy market to examine such behavior. In a...

We develop an analytical model to derive the competitive market equilibrium for electricity spot and reserve markets under stochastic demand and uncertain renewable electricity generation. We then derive the welfare-optimal provision of reserves. At rst-best, cost of reserve capacity is balanced...

This paper develops a stylized model of cross-border balancing. We distinguish three degrees of cooperation: autarky, reserves exchange and reserves sharing. The model shows that TSO cooperation reduces costs. The gains of cooperation increase with cost asymmetry and decrease with correlation of...

This paper is an empirical investigation of how traders react to public news in a market where there are lots of non-scheduled announcements, often arriving simultaneously. Using detailed trade information from the Nordic intra-day electricity market and GARCH models, this paper examines market...