The present paper analyzes the interaction between the economic review of the probition of abuses of a dominant position (Article 82 EC) on the one hand and the efforts to enhance private enforcement of competition law through private damage claims on the other hand. The paper argues that...

Efficiency defence and merger remedies are key components in most merger control regimes. Although in many jurisdictions both the provision of efficiency-related evidence and remedy offers are at the merging firms' discretion, most previous works have only analysed them separately. This paper is...

Private antitrust litigation often involves a dominant firm being accused of exclusionary conduct by a smaller rival. In such cases, the defendant generally has a much larger financial stake in the outcome. We explore the implications of this asymmetry in a model of litigation with endogenous...

Patent settlements between rivals restrain competition in many different ways. Antitrust requires them to be "proportional" in that their anti-competitive effects are commensurate with the firms' expectations about (counterfactual) patent litigation. Because these expectations are private and...

The SSNIP test and Critical Loss Analysis are widely used tools for determining market definition in merger and sometimes other antitrust matters. However, the standard techniques used to test for a relevant antitrust market are incorrect when the firms in question operate two-sided platforms....

An important action that is illegal according to competition law, both in the US and Europe, is predatory pricing. In this paper we develop a model that allows an entrant to sue an incumbent for predatory pricing. The cost of production is essential for judgments in such cases, and we allow the...

When firms collude and charge supra-competitive prices, consumers can bring antitrust lawsuits against the firms. When the litigation cost is low, firms accept the cost as just another cost of doing business, whereas when the cost is high, the firms lower the price to deter litigation. Class...

Although price-fixing conspiracies are inherently unstable, many cartels manage to endure, often for long periods. Many successful cartels have hierarchical structures made up of high-level executives (principals) and lower-level managers (agents). For these cartels, agency cost theory could...