Co-operative movement dawned in India a century ago to eradicate indebtedness and to accelerate agricultural production in India. Co-operatives are eminently suited to achieve social, economic changes in rural India. However, credit risk is acute in co-operative credit system, predominantly...

Does enhancing banks' information sets and understanding of credit risks improve loan loss recognition? We study this question using a global dataset of staggered initiations and coverage increases of public credit registries (PCRs). Mandated by national regulators, PCRs collect borrower and...

The majority of informal finance, in developed and developing countries, is provided by family and friends. Yet existing models of informal finance better fit “informal moneylenders” insomuch as they fail to match two salient characteristics of family finance: family investors often accept...

In this paper, we ask how firms’ optimal debt structure responds to a change in the bankruptcy regime. While existing work shows that this relationship is dependent on the ex-ante liquidation value of a firm, we demonstrate that the ownership of lenders they are connected to also matters. We...

We extend the literature on the effects of managerial entrenchment to consider how safety-net subsidies and financial distress costs interact with managerial incentives to influence capital structure in U.S. commercial banking. Using cross-sectional data on publicly traded, highest-level U.S....

An empirical model of managers' demand for agency goods is derived and estimated using the Almost Ideal Demand System of Deaton and Muellbauer (AER 1980). As in Jensen and Meckling (JFE 1976), we derive managers' demand for agency goods by maximizing a managerial utility function where managers...

We extend the literature on the effects of managerial entrenchment on capital structure to consider how safety-net subsidies and financial distress costs interact with managerial incentives to influence capital structure in U.S. commercial banking. Using cross-sectional data on publicly traded,...

Using banking data, I provide evidence that agency problems are at the root of internal capital market inefficiency. I find that publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs) are less efficient in their internal capital allocation than non-publicly traded BHCs. This suggests that the divergence...