“trust game” in parallel with a finitely repeated “microcredit game.” There are two agent types: “regular” and “trustworthy … (modeled by the level of trust) in the community where the group lending programs are located. Agents play a finitely repeated … conditions under which the presence of trust as an equilibrium of the trust game can enhance the success of the group lending …

In recent years, microfinance institutions have expanded into group lending with individual liability, leaving out the … repay a group loan to safeguard their reputation. We show that the introduction of group loans with individual liability … importance to their reputation will select into individual liability loans, causing default rates and interest rates to rise for …

This paper shows that market fragility and mass default can arise in microcredit markets as a result of the strategic … interaction between a microlender using a reputation-based mechanism and a traditional lender using physical collateral. In our … rather than microfinance in isolation …

We suggest an explanation for the existence of "mission drift", the tendency for Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) to …

We suggest an explanation for the existence of “mission drift”, the tendency for Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) to …