We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria. In all settings there was considerable...

Costly third party punishment has been interpreted as a tool for studying the enforcement of social norms. Experiments on this topic typically involve a third party observer who can pay to decrease the payoff of a player who has behaved selfishly (or generously) toward another. We investigate...

Institutional punishment plays a central role in human societies. Yet research in evolutionary game theory has focused almost exclusively on peer punishment. Here we present a model for the evolution of institutional punishment. We consider a set of states ('kingdoms'), each consisting of a...

This paper studies decision making by successful entrepreneurs and their agents. Since entrepreneurs decisions are often influenced by their agents' advice, understanding the behavior of both involved parties is crucial in analyzing observed decisions. To this end, a sample of successful...

We have participants play two sets of repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (RPD) games, one with a large continuation probability and the other with a small continuation probability (stage game payoffs and continuation probabilities are common knowledge). We find that, regardless of which is played...

Four experiments examine how lack of awareness of inequality affect behaviour towards the rich and poor. In Experiment 1, participants who became aware that wealthy individuals donated a smaller percentage of their income switched from rewarding the wealthy to rewarding the poor. In Experiments...

Microcredit—the distribution of small, uncollateralized but jointly liable loans to the poorest of the poor—has been touted as a powerful approach for combatting global poverty. While some microcredit programs enjoy high repayment rates, others face unsustainably high default rates. Efforts...