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Network sharing agreements have become increasingly widespread in mobile telecommunications markets. They carry undeniable advantages to operators and consumers alike, but also the potential for consumer harm. Not all NSAs are created equal: the assessment of the balance of harm and benefits to...
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We report experimental evidence on the effect of observability of actions on bank runs. We model depositors' decision-making in a sequential framework, with three depositors located at the nodes of a network. Depositors observe the other depositors' actions only if connected by the network....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222336
This paper introduces the possibility of signaling into a finite-depositor version of the Diamond-Dybvig model. More precisely, the decision to keep the funds in the bank is assumed to be unobservable, but depositors are allowed to make it observable by signaling, at a cost. Depositors decide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135812
We study the effects of deposit insurance and observability of previous actions on the emergence of bank runs by means of a controlled laboratory experiment. We consider three depositors in the line of a common bank. Depositors decide in sequence between withdrawing or keeping their money...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087666
We report experimental evidence on the effect of observability of actions on bank runs. We model depositors' decision-making in a sequential framework, with three depositors located at the nodes of a network. Depositors observe the other depositors' actions only if connected by the network. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087690
We study the Diamond-Dybvig model of fi nancial intermediation (JPE, 1983) under the assumption that depositors have information about previous decisions. Depositors decide sequentially whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding them in the bank. If depositors observe the history of all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013073720
We provide experimental evidence that panic bank runs occur in the absence of problems with fundamentals and coordination failures among depositors, the two main culprits identified in the literature. Depositors withdraw when they observe that others do so, even when theoretically they should...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012959615