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specialized enforcement technology is sufficiently effective, cooperation is best sustained by a "single enforcer punishment …We introduce the possibility of direct punishment by specialized enforcers into a model of community enforcement … following deviations by regular agent is that such actions, by reducing future cooperation, would decrease the amount of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491715
Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional … maximize compliance? We investigate this question by modeling the co-evolution of law and cooperation in a public goods game … punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316651
anger, ‘social’ emotions like shame and guilt need to be present for punishment to be an effective deterrent of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325579
show that stochastic punishment falls short of sustaining cooperation in the repeated public good game. As punishment noise …Identifying mechanisms able to sustain costly cooperation among self-interested agents is a central problem across … social and biological sciences. One possible solution is peer punishment: when agents have an opportunity to sanction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013322066
Most of the literature on the evolution of human pro-sociality looks at reasons why evolution made us not play the Nash … prosocial behaviour, we should look at reasons why evolution made us not play the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in sequential …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427580
This paper presents a unified framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium in simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine spillover effects that depend on the rank-order of her decision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325768
In a contest with positional dynamics between an incumbent and a challenger i) inequality of power may magnify conflicts, ii) more severe conflicts can go together with lower turnover of incumbents, and iii) power can be self defeating as cost advantages can reduce pay-offs. These three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287741
Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk-Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994144
interact, plays however a vital role in the evolution of conflicts. By relating the individual pay-off perceptions for each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009702311
Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk-Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658435