A methodology is proposed to estimate structural models of product line competition. This methodology enables researchers to estimate demand systems accounting for the endogeneity of the mix of products available in each market, an issue which is typically ignored in the empirical literature. In...

Some scholars have argued that the phenomenon known as common ownership, which refers to an investor's simultaneous ownership of small stockholdings in several competing companies, is anticompetitive and prohibited by the U.S. antitrust laws. These proponents target in particular large...

Some scholars have argued that common ownership, which refers to an investor's simultaneous ownership of small stockholdings in several competing companies, is anticompetitive and prohibited by the U.S. antitrust laws. Proponents of this view target in particular large investment managers that...

Partial ownership of stock in multiple competing firms is an important scholarly and policy topic in both corporate and antitrust law. Until now, the discussion has focused on ownership. This essay shifts the debate from a focus on common ownership to a focus on common control. No prior work has...

By introducing the excess burden of taxation, we analyze endogenous choice of organizational form between U-form and M-form in the multiproduct mixed duopoly. With managerial delegation in public and private firms, we find that choosing M-form (U-form) for the public and private firms is a...

We analyze endogenous choice of organizational forms between U-form and M-form in the multiproduct mixed duopoly. With managerial delegation in public and private firms, we find that choosing M-form for the public and private firms is a dominant strategy under mixed duopoly in either Bertrand or...

Horizontal shareholding exists when significant shareholders have stock in horizontal competitors. (It is often imprecisely called "common shareholding," but that term can also apply when shareholders own stock in two noncompeting corporations. It differs from "cross-shareholding," which...

This Article shows that new economic proofs and empirical evidence provide powerful confirmation that, even when horizontal shareholders individually have minority stakes, horizontal shareholding in concentrated markets often has anticompetitive effects. The new economic proofs show that,...

Horizontal shareholdings exist when a common set of investors own significant shares in corporations that are horizontal competitors in a product market. Economic models show that substantial horizontal shareholdings are likely to anticompetitively raise prices when the owned businesses compete...

Although empirical studies show that common shareholding affects corporate conduct and that common horizontal shareholding lessens competition, critics have argued that the law should not take any action until we have clearer proof on the causal mechanisms. I show that we actually have ample...