It is well established that adaptation and technological investment in each case may serve as a commitment device in international climate politics. This paper for the first time analyzes the combined impact of these two strategic variables on global mitigation within a noncooperative framework...

We examine the distributional and efficiency impacts of climate policy in the context of fiscal consolidation in a dynamic general-equilibrium overlapping generations model of the US economy. The model includes a disaggregated production structure, including energy sector detail and advanced...

If bioenergy has a less negative impact on the climate than fossil energy, it may be optimal to have a significant increase in the use of bioenergy over time. Due to the difference in the way the climate is affected by the two types of energy, the future time path of the use of bioenergy may be...

Swiss climate policy consists of three regulatory instruments for greenhouse gas emissions reduction: A CO 2 levy, the Swiss Emissions Trading System (CH EHS), and an additional nonEHS" program for medium-sized plants that consists of command-and-control elements plus a sizeable abatement...

In view of the challenges posed by climate change and the increase in climate targets by 2030 in the EU, as well as Austria's goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2040, the question of effective climate policy instruments is gaining in importance. The pricing of CO2, for instance in the form...

The extent of future climate change is a policy choice. Using an integrated climate-economy assessment model, we estimate climate policy curves (CPCs) that link the price of carbon dioxide (CO2) to subsequent global temperatures. The resulting downward sloping CPCs quantify the inverse...

Intergenerational altruism and contemporaneous cooperation are both important to the provision of long-lived public goods. Equilibrium climate protection may depend more sensitively on either of these considerations, depending on the type of policy rule one examines. This conclusion is based on...

Obtaining significant levels of cooperation in public good and environmental games, under the assumption of players being purely selfish, is usually prevented by the problem of freeriding. Coalitions, in fact, generally fail to be internally stable and this cause a serious underprovision of the...

From the perspective of standard public good theory the total amount of greenhouse gas mitigation (or public good supply in general) will be lower in a leader-follower game than in a simultaneous Nash game so that strategic leadership is disadvantageous for climate policy. We show that this need...

Climate is a persistent asset, bar none: changes in climate-related stocks have consequences spanning over centuries or possibly millennia to the future. To reconcile the discounting of such far-distant impacts and realism of the shorter-term decisions, we consider hyperbolic time-preferences in...