This note compares the investment policy and managerial compensation in family and non-family firms. The model is based on one hand a manager/shareholders conflict that should be more pronounced in non-family firms. Secondly large shareholders/small shareholders conflict should play a...

Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...

We document a significantly negative correlation between the absolute sensitivity of the CEO's option portfolio value to dividend yield (denoted by the Greek letter Psi) and corporate dividend payouts. After the implementation of the FAS 123R, firms that reduce the CEOs' holdings of highly...

The aim of the article is to present the theories of remuneration. Both classical and modern theories are presented within their time and economic environment. The anchor of article is the model principal-agent and reducing asymmetric information through remuneration. The conclusions of the...

We explore the determinants of compensation gaps between a firm's CEO and its other top executives, and compare the ability of two competing optimal contracting theories, namely tournament theory and productivity theory, to explain the cross sectional variability in these gaps across firms. We...

That people respond to incentives is a common belief. This became even stronger during the course of the financial crisis in 2008/09 as incentive schemes of banks are broadly considered as main reason for the crisis. This paper covers the question if and how incentives work evaluated by their...

Chatty and Saez (2004) argued that more Principal-Agent models explaining firm dividend policy are expected and subsequently offered a model of dividend policy that includes a tax on dividends and agency problems (Chatty and Saez (2007)). In this paper we extent their model by adding a tax on...

This study examines whether risk aversion-inducing CEO compensation motivates managers to pay more dividends regardless of investor preferences. Using inside debt (i.e., pensions and deferred compensation) and the sensitivity of CEO equity compensation to stock price changes (i.e., high CEO...

With imperfect market hypothesis, it is widely accepted that announcements of dividend payouts affect firm value. An explanation has been proposed with the cash flow signaling theory and the dividend information content hypothesis. This original explanation, was developed in theoretical models...

This paper surveys the literature on payout policy. We start out by discussing several stylized facts that are important to the development of any comprehensive payout policy framework. We then describe the Miller and Modigliani (1961) payout irrelevance proposition, and consider the effect of...