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Collateral is a widely used, but not well understood, debt-contracting feature. Two broad strands of theoretical literature explain collateral as arising from the existence of either ex ante private information or ex post incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. However, the extant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292349
Banks often have to determine the credit worthiness, i.e. the ability to repay the loan, of their customers ex …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296951
Currently, private trust in commercial banks declines as a consequence of today´s financial crisis. As past crises, e … in a New Keynesian framework with commercial banks in order to analyze the implications of a loss of confidence. In …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010298768
stochastic policy mix lead to suboptimal allocations if banks do not internalize insolvency costs. The policy of forbearance may … make banks internalizing such costs and improves the efficiency of intermediation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422144
Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to … asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325499
We study the effects of a bank’s engagement in trading. Traditional banking is relationship-based: not scalable, long … leads trading in banks to become increasingly risky, so that problems in managing and regulating trading in banks will …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326206
We describe a dynamic model of financial intermediation in which fundamental characteristics of the economy imply a unique equilibrium path of bank and financial market lending. Yet we also show that economies whose fundamental characteristics have converged may continue to have very different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011604488
The paper proposes a theory of the anti-competitive effects of debt finance based on the interaction between capital structure, managerial incentives, and firms' ability to sustain collusive agreements. It shows that shareholders' commitments that reduce conflicts with debtholders such as hiring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608557
equilibrium when banks have monopoly power, justifying a Pigouvian tax in this case. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274744
This paper analyzes the influence of market discipline on the risk-taking incentives of banks. It is shown that market … discipline reduces risk if banks can credibly commit to a given level of risk before the interest rate on deposits is set. If … in risk. The reason is that rational depositors anticipate the banks' behavior and therefore ask for a higher risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430018