We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market framework. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its profit stream in a continuous-time...

This paper analyzes exclusionary conduct of platforms in two-sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases against shopping centers introducing radius restrictions on their tenants, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent...

There is increasing empirical and experimental evidence thatproviding financial incentives to agents to performcertain socially desirable actions may permanently reduce other typesof motivations to undertake these actions.We study the impact of financial incentives on the desire for...

I develop a structural demand model for mobile telephone service, which facilitates the identification of network effects and compatibility between networks. Network effects are measured by the dependence of consumer willingness to pay on the installed base of subscribers. Compatibility is...

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: We develop a general theoretical framework of trade on a platform on which buyers and sellers interact. The platform may be owned by a single large, or many small independent or vertically integrated intermediaries. We...