In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive players and the Equal Division rule does not concern itself...

The principle of weak monotonicity for cooperative games states that if a game changes so that the worth of the grand coalition and some player's marginal contribution to all coalitions increase or stay the same, then this player's payoff should not decrease. We investigate the class of values...

We provide a new characterization of the Shapley value neither using the efficiency axiom nor the additivity axiom. In this characterization, efficiency is replaced by the gain-loss axiom (Einy and Haimanko, 2011, Game Econ Behav 73: 615-621), i.e., whenever the total worth generated does not...

We consider an analytic formulation/parametrization of the class of efficient, linear, and symmetric values for TU games that, in contrast to previous approaches, which rely on the standard basis, rests on the linear representation of TU games by unanimity games. Unlike most of the other...

We provide new characterizations of the equal surplus division value and the equal division value as well as of the class of their convex mixtures. This way, the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value is pinpointed to one axiom....