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We investigate the implications of Network Neutrality regulation for Internet fragmentation. We model a two-sided market, where Content Providers (CPs) and consumers interact through Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and CPs sell consumers' attention to advertisers. Under Network Neutrality, CPs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420580
Numerous countries are introducing citizen feedback schemes to tame corruption. We study how best to incorporate feedback in public officials' incentives. The main novelty of our proposal is to allow citizens to directly influence officials' pay. We consider a situation in which entrepreneurs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343756
This paper analyses the market transformations in heritage tourism destinations when excessivetourism demand determines the emergence of a class of excursionists among visitors. Building onthe approach of Keane (1997) and Shapiro (1983), our model highlights some importantdimensions of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316879
We investigate the implications of Network Neutrality regulation for Internet fragmentation. We model a two-sided market, where Content Providers (CPs) and consumers interact through Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and CPs sell consumers' attention to advertisers. Under Network Neutrality, CPs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010201164
Ownership takeovers often follow complex strategies where the control of the target firm is acquired through a sequence of independent contracts. Based on this observation, we develop a novel theoretical model wherein the acquiring firm decides on the number of steps towards the full ownership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011554398
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We investigate the scope for supervisory activities in organizations in which information is non-verifiable and opportunism severe. A principal-supervisor-agent hierarchy is considered. Side-contracts between supervisor and agent may be reached both before and after the agent has chosen his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089952