We expand Acemoglu and Pischke's seminal model of training in imperfect labor markets by including the system of collective wage bargaining and the components of firms' training costs. Thus we can adapt their model to institutional changes that occurred since the 1990s. The model and the...

In the centuries leading up to the Industrial Revolution, Western Europe gradually pulled ahead of other world regions in terms of technological creativity, population growth, and income per capita. We argue that superior institutions for the creation and dissemination of productive knowledge...

This paper considers the optimal level of firm-specific training by taking into account the positive effect of training on the expected duration of workers current employment. In the framework of an efficiency wage model, a short expected job tenure represents a disamenity that reduces the...

Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive...

We study the design of careers by a principal who trains a cash-constrained agent, or apprentice, who is free to walk away at any time. The principal specifies time paths of knowledge transfer, effort provision, and task allocation, subject to the apprentice's continued participation. In the...

In the centuries leading up to the Industrial Revolution, Western Europe gradually pulled ahead of other world regions in terms of technological creativity, population growth, and income per capita. We argue that superior institutions for the creation and dissemination of productive knowledge...

We analyse the efficiency of the labour market outcome in a competitive search equilibrium model with endogenous turnover and endogenous general human capital formation. We show that search frictions do not distort training decisions if firms and their employees are able to coordinate...

External certification of workplace skills obtained through on-the-job training is widespread in many countries. This may indicate that training is financed by workers, and certification serves to assure the quality of the training offered by the firm. However, other evidence shows that general...

In the human capital model with perfect labor markets, firms never invest in general skills and all costs of general training are borne by workers. When labor market frictions compress the structure of wages, firms may pay for these investments. The distortion in the wage structure turns...