structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these … the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational … of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are …

structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these … the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational … of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are …

. -- matching ; stable payoff ; competitive equilibrium payoff ; optimal stable payoff ; lattice …

model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal …-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of …

We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary …

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and … Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts … stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable. -- Matching …

We study Nash implementation in many-to-one matching problems also known as college admission problems [Gale and … Shapley, College admission and the stability of marriage, Amer. Math. Monthly 69 (1962) 9-15]. In contrast to the previous … not equivalent to the marriage problem, J. Econ. Theory 36 (1985) 277-288] which rules out complementarities. We show that …