Showing 1 - 10 of 30
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014228706
We study the stability of voluntary cooperation in response to varying group growth rates. Using a laboratory public-good game, we construct a situation where increasing group size yields potential efficiency gains, but only with sustained cooperation. We then study the effect of exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009748765
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012703323
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012171943
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008655651
We study the stability of voluntary cooperation in response to varying group growth rates. Using a laboratory public-good game, we construct a situation where increasing group size yields potential efficiency gains, but only with sustained cooperation. We then study the effect of exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316831
We study the stability of voluntary cooperation in response to varying group growth rates. Using a laboratory public-good game, we construct a situation where increasing group size yields potential efficiency gains, but only with sustained cooperation. We then study the effect of exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064856
We develop and test a framework of mental information representation in an asset market setting. The model predicts heterogeneous trading behavior as a consequence of two distinct mental capabilities: analytical skills and mentalizing, where the former involves quantitative, objective aspects of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935621
We study the stability of voluntary cooperation in response to varying rates at which a group grows. Using a laboratory public-good game with voluntary contributions and economies of scale, we construct a situation in which expanding a group's size yields potential efficiency gains, but only if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055373
In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the true performance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament. According to the standard approach, rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268559