We examine the impact of public information on firms’ disclosure strategies. We portray two regimes based on a model that extends the setting of Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988). In the first regime, the firm is able to respond to public information and thus has the last word, and in the...

We analyse how soft information acquired at a cost by a lender affects the debt contract between the lender and a project manager, and the manager's incentive to invest in a specific asset. Under certain conditions, the lender chooses to acquire soft information about the profitability of the...

This experiment examines forecasting behavior under varying information conditions to assess the extent to which traders in security markets incorporate information in trading activity to resolve fundamental uncertainty and to resolve higher-order uncertainty. Fundamental uncertainty refers to a...

Investor disagreement about public information precision can be pervasive and persistent. This paper shows that when investors agree to disagree about an observed public signal's precision, as they disagree more, informational price efficiency increases. By contrast, when investors disagree...