We analyze the political economy of monetary unification among countries with different quality of institutions. Countries with stronger institutions have lower public spending and better investment incentives, even under a stronger currency. Governments under weaker institutions spend more so...

I formulate a political-economy model of a fiscal union where the threat of secession imposes a limit on fiscal redistribution between regions. I argue that the trade-off between implementing the region's preferred fiscal policy and benefiting from inter-regional risk sharing depends on the...

We analyze the political economy of monetary unification among countries with different quality of institutions. Countries with stronger institutions have lower public spending and better productive incentives, even under a stronger currency. Governments under weaker institutions spend more and...

Using a refined version of the multi-country AB-SFC model of a Monetary Union already presented in Caiani et al. (2018a, 2019) the paper aims at providing a tentative assessment of the economic effects of transforming the European Monetary Union into an Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer Union...

In this paper we use a medium-scale DSGE model to quantitatively assess the macroeconomic stabilisation properties of a supranational unemployment insurance scheme. The model is calibrated to the euro area's core and periphery and features a rich fiscal sector, sovereign risk premia and labour...

There is evidence for a strong demand for safety, both steady and inelastic. A sudden loss of safe assets played a key role in the financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis. I show that a common fiscal policy can benefit all member states of a monetary union by offering a more...

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary...

Fiscal federalism may not be a panacea in a monetary union if it does not address the non-cooperative behaviour between fiscal policymakers. To prove this, we assess the relative merits of a fiscal federalism scheme in a monetary union and intergovernmental fiscal cooperation without such a...

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary...