We investigate the cost of capital in a model with an agency conflict between inside managers and outside shareholders. Inside ownership reflects the classic tradeoff between incentives and risk diversification, and the severity of agency costs depends on a parameter representing investor...

Q-theory predicts that investment frictions steepen the relation between expected returns and firm investment. Using financing constraints to proxy for investment frictions, we document only weak evidence that the investment-to-assets and asset growth effects in the cross-section of returns are...

We investigate the cost of capital in a model with an agency conflict between inside managers and outside shareholders. Inside ownership reflects the classic tradeoff between incentives and risk diversification, and the severity of agency costs depends on a parameter representing investor...

We question a deep-ingrained doctrine in asset pricing: if an empirical characteristic-return relation is consistent with investor “rationality,” the relation must be “explained” by a risk factor model. The investment approach changes the big picture of asset pricing. Factors formed on...

A deep-ingrained doctrine in asset pricing says that if an empirical characteristic-return relation is consistent with investor “rationality,” the relation must be “explained” by a risk (factor) model. The investment approach questions the doctrine. Factors formed on characteristics are...

Methodologically, the recommended investment project (IP) selection system is distinguished from one in force by: new conception allowing for time factor; evaluating IP efficiency by eventual reproduction results, not by intermediate investment activity results (included is a generalized...

We propose and test a theory of corporate liquidity management in which credit lines provided by banks to firms are a form of monitored liquidity insurance. Bank monitoring and resulting credit line revocations help control illiquidity-seeking behavior by firms. Firms with high liquidity risk...

We propose and test a theory of corporate liquidity management in which credit lines provided by banks to firms are a form of monitored liquidity insurance. Bank monitoring and resulting credit line revocations help control illiquidity-seeking behavior by firms. Firms with high liquidity risk...

Treating the potential endogeneity problems of the empirical specifications in prior studies, I employ a dynamic multi-equation model in which firms make interdependent decisions in financing, investment, and distribution, under the constraint that sources and uses of cash must be equal. I argue...

Using asset prices I estimate the marginal value of capital in a dynamic stochastic economy under general assumptions about technology and preferences. The state-space measure of marginal q relies on the joint measurability of the value function, i.e. firm market value, and its underlying firm...