Speed hierarchy not only motivates fast trading competition on less precise information but also renders slower traders more informative. As a result, endogenous speed acquisition in equilibrium affects how information is produced and spread. When information diffusion is characterized by its...

This paper develops a finite-period model of rational bubbles where trade of an asset takes place through a chain of middlemen. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium, and a bubble can occur due to higher-order uncertainty. Under reasonable assumptions, the equilibrium price is...

The paper contrasts theories that explain diverse belief by asymmetric private information (in short PI) with theories which postulate agents use subjective heterogenous beliefs (in short HB). We focus on problems where agents forecast aggregates such as profit rate of the Samp;P500 and our...

Traders differ in speed and their speed differences matter. I model strategic interactions induced when high frequency traders (HFTs) have different speeds in an extended Kyle (1985) framework. HFTs are assumed to anticipate incoming orders and trade rapidly to exploit normal-speed traders'...

We examine the role that spot markets and physical inventories play in revealing to uninformed traders the expectations of informed traders. Although many papers investigate potential mechanisms by which futures markets may disseminate such information, the role of spot markets has not been...

Recent empirical studies suggest that, during times of unexpected innovation, agents heterogeneously update their beliefs about an asset fundamental value, and they are uncertain about other agents' beliefs on it. In this paper I show that, when there is uncertainty about the market sentiment,...

How can fire sales for financial assets happen when the economy contains well capitalized, but non-specialist investors? Our explanation combines rational expectations equilibrium and "lemons" models. When specialist (informed) market participants are liquidity-constrained, prices become less...

We examine an analyst with career concerns making cheap talk recommendations to a sequence of traders, each of whom possesses private information concerning the analyst's ability. The recommendations of the analyst influence asset prices that are then used to evaluate the analyst. An endogeneity...

We study information aggregation in a dynamic trading model with partially informed and ambiguity averse traders. We show theoretically that separable securities, introduced by Ostrovsky (2012) in the context of Subjective Expected Utility, no longer aggregate information if some traders have...

Why do firms engage in costly, voluntary disclosure of informationwhich is subsumed by a later announcement? We consider a model inwhich the firm's manager can choose to disclose short-term informationwhich becomes redundant later. When disclosure costs are sufficientlylow, the manager discloses...