Reverse mergers are an alternative method to IPOs for going public and announcement day price reaction to reverse mergers is comparable to the initial day price reaction to IPOs. Most of the academic theories developed thus far to explain the market's reaction to IPOs, however, are not...

In this short expository note I provide an overview of leveraged buy-out transactions (“LBOs”). I show in detail how an LBO transaction is structured and financed, as well as the typical return profile. I also provide a sample transaction accompanied by financial projections, debt repayment...

We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market (CEO turnover and remuneration schemes) in two different regulatory regimes, namely before and after the sweeping governance reforms adopted in the UK in the 1990s. We employ sample selection models to examine firms in a...

We survey the theory and evidence of behavioral corporate finance, which generally takes one of two approaches. The market timing and catering approach views managerial financing and investment decisions as rational managerial responses to securities mispricing. The managerial biases approach...

The book proposes an original contribution to the economics and finance literature by developing the foundations of corporate finance. It also covers in detail various corporate governance issues faced by organizations. The common treatment of corporate finance and corporate governance started...

We investigate whether the concentration of power in the hands of individuals characterized as business leaders influences the variability of corporate performance. We do so by proposing an original method to estimate the concentration of power that takes into account both the individual...

In this paper, we examine the differences in information asymmetry and financing patterns and a generalized version of the trade-off theory across countries with different institutional environments. We find that firms in Civil law countries have higher information asymmetry, rely more on...

This study examines the agency costs of corporate lobbying by exploring the relation between lobbying and excess CEO compensation. We show that CEOs of firms engaged in lobbying earn significantly greater compensation levels compared to CEOs in non-lobbying firms, after controlling for standard...

The corporate governance literature has shown that self-interested controlling owners tend to divert corporate resources for private benefits at the expense of other shareholders. Such behavior leads the controlling owners to prefer long maturity debt to short maturity debt, to avoid frequent...

Debt-type compensation (i.e., inside debt) exacerbates the divergence in risk preference between the CEO and shareholders that in turn affects the firm's capital structure decisions. An excessively risk-averse CEO uses debt that falls short of the shareholders' desired level, and is eager to...