We use a labor-search model to explain why the worst employment slumps often follow expansions of household debt. We find that households protected by limited liability suffer from a household-debt-overhang problem that leads them to require high wages to work. Firms respond by posting high...

We develop a model of a firm in financial distress. Distress can be mitigated by filing for bankruptcy, which is costly, or preempted by restructuring, which is impeded by a collective action problem. We find that bankruptcy and restructuring are complements, not substitutes: Reducing bankruptcy...

We develop a model in which, as in practice, bank debt is both a financial security used to raise funds and a kind of money used to facilitate trade. This dual role of bank debt provides a new rationale for why banks do what they do. In the model, banks endogenously perform the essential...

Sovereigns in distress often engage in debt restructuring, typically negotiating with multiple classes of bondholders at once. We investigate whether sovereign bondholders benefit from committing not to restructure their debt. To do so, we use a court ruling that made one class of bonds easier...

We theoretically investigate the effect of public information — such as credit ratings and securities analysts' reports — on investor welfare in the context of delegated asset management. Specifically, we ask: does more precise public information increase investor welfare by decreasing an...

Effective monitoring by equity blockholders is important for good corporate governance. A prominent theoretical literature argues that the threat of block sale ("exit") can be an affective governance mechanism. Many blockholders are money managers. We show that when money managers compete for...