We examine how tax cuts that benefit some firms are related to the economic performance of their direct competitors. Consistent with tax cuts decreasing the cost of initiating competitive strategies, we find that a decrease in the tax burden for only a certain group of firms in the U.S. economy...

'Prominence' plays an important role in financial reporting – an entity might assign an item to the footnotes, report it below the line, or comment on it in a press release versus the MD&A. We propose a model where quantitative disclosures are classified as more or less prominent, based on...

This paper investigates the efficiency consequences of firm disclosure. Using accounting and financial data in the Chinese market, the largest emerging market dominated by noise traders, we find that disclosure attracts noise trading and reduces the amount of information learned by firms from...

This paper examines the relation between information's properties, such as reliability and relevance, and public disclosure policy. It shows that the optimal accounting system often involves a carefully balanced combination of mandatory and voluntary disclosure, with mandatory reporting focused...

We investigate the association between voluntary disclosure and the risk-related discount investors apply to price. First, we study the association between (endogenous) disclosure choice and the discount in price induced by changes in the underlying model parameters: this is akin to an empirical...

While the social and economic impacts of how disclosures are presented are well-understood, it is less clear how disclosure decisions unfold throughout the annual reporting cycle. We study this issue by exploring the experience of interpreting and implementing corporate reporting rules, focusing...

We study how the qualitative tax information disclosure affects firm behavior. We create a novel measure of qualitative tax disclosure using machine learning algorithms. Using a UK reform as an exogenous shock that affected a group of firms, we show causal effects of mandating disclosure of...

We offer that, when regulators require firms to obtain stakeholder approval of a corporate decision through voting on a resolution, firms disclose additional information that is needed for stakeholders to understand the optimal nature of the proposal and to vote in favor of it. We suggest that...

We study firms' voluntary disclosures in a world of potential information leaks. We find that managers adapt their disclosure strategy to the likelihood and expected scope of leaks. An increasing likelihood fosters voluntary disclosure if leaks merely expose the manager's information endowment...