The multitask principal-agent theory argues that incentive devices for the agent tend to be complementary due to the need for balanced allocation of effort among the tasks. A growing body of empirical literature appears to support this notion. However, when there can be several signals for each...

This study examines a public policy issue: whether government officials engage in earnings management to collude with private investors in the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We find that the managers of listed Chinese SOEs, who are de facto bureaucrats, employ income-decreasing...

We show that public firm profit rates fell by half since 1980. Inferred as the residual from the rise of US corporate profit rates in aggregate data, private firm profit rates doubled since 1980. Public firm financial returns matched their fall in profit rates, while public firm...

This paper studies the capital allocation decisions of firms that are comparable except for ownership under a unique setting using investment level data. We find allocative inefficiency across ownership to be exacerbated under policy distortions through subsidized credits targeted at state-owned...

Research in management and related fields largely assumes that host-country state (state) ownership in investment projects raises risk for private co-investors. We question that assumption in theorizing that minority state ownership may actually decrease investment risk in host countries where...

We study corporate investments around national elections in India. Investment rates drop by a nonsignificant 2.2% for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in election years. The decrease is significantly larger for private firms, which record an investment drop of 7.4%. The decrease in investment for...

We compare investment policies across public and private firms in different institutional settings. Using a large cross-country dataset, we find that public listed firms are better positioned to take advantage of growth opportunities than private firms. Specifically, public listed firms exhibit...

We examine how heterogeneity in organizational structure affects private firm earnings quality in the European Union. Organizational structure refers to whether the firm is organized as a single legal entity (standalone) or as a business group: the former are firms not controlling or controlled...