This paper exploits temporal and spatial variation in the implementation of US sick pay mandates to assess their labor market consequences. We use the Synthetic Control Group Method (SCGM) and the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) to estimate the causal effect of mandated sick...

This paper exploits temporal and spatial variation in the implementation of US sick pay mandates to assess their labor market consequences. We use the Synthetic Control Group Method (SCGM) and the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) to estimate the causal effect of mandated sick...

In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination based on con- sumer characteristics like age, gender, and medical history. In this paper, I build on a recent literature to show why such policies are inefficient if consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for insurance...

We present and empirically implement an equilibrium labor market search model where risk averse workers facing medical expenditure shocks are matched with firms making health insurance coverage decisions. Our model delivers a rich set of predictions that can account for a wide variety of...

Many criticisms of Medicare and Social Security have suggested that beneficiaries get more than they paid into the system over their lifetimes and these entitlement programs may be unsustainable if they are insufficiently funded. But studies do not always use appropriate assumptions for...

We present and empirically implement an equilibrium labor market search model where risk averse workers facing medical expenditure shocks are matched with firms making health insurance coverage decisions. Our model delivers a rich set of predictions that can account for a wide variety of...

We present and empirically implement an equilibrium labor market search model where risk averse workers facing medical expenditure shocks are matched with firms making health insurance coverage decisions. Our model delivers a rich set of predictions that can account for a wide variety of...

This paper develops and estimates a life‐cycle equilibrium labor search model in which heterogeneous firms determine health insurance provisions and heterogeneous workers sort themselves into jobs with different compensation packages over the life cycle. I study the optimal joint design of...

We present and empirically implement an equilibrium labor market search model where risk averse workers facing medical expenditure shocks are matched with firms making health insurance coverage decisions. Our model delivers a rich set of predictions that can account for a wide variety of...

Moral hazard and adverse selection create inefficiencies in private health insurance markets. The authors use claims data from a large firm to study the independent roles of both moral hazard and adverse selection. Previous studies have attempted to estimate moral hazard in private health...