This paper applies the economic theories of fiscal federalism and jurisdictional competition to the question whether the juridical presumption favoring decentralization of authority manifested in the European Union's subsidiarity principle has been rebutted in the case the Code of Conduct on...

We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: the distance between the...

In many transition economies, insiders controlled state-owned firms, de facto. For such firms, we model the decision about privatization method, focusing on the choice between free distribution (so called ‘mass privatization’) and management-employee buyouts. We incorporate a political...

Numerous countries are introducing citizen feedback schemes to tame corruption. We study how best to incorporate feedback in public officials' incentives. The main novelty of our proposal is to allow citizens to directly influence officials' pay. We consider a situation in which entrepreneurs...

How does the environment of an organization influence whether workers voluntarily provide effort? We study the power relationship between a non-profit unit (e.g. university department, NGO, health trust), where workers care about the result of their work, and a bu- reaucrat, who supplies some...

How should the Supreme Court resolve, in its forthcoming Seila Law decision on the permissibility of single-headed independent agencies, the split between en banc decisions in the Fifth Circuit and D.C. Circuit? Although the Court will likely (and I argue, correctly) extend its 2010 Free...